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Abstract 
The paper addresses the welfare implications of conditional grants in the presence of 
inefficiencies in regional production. While conditional grants may set incentives for regions 
to reduce inefficiencies, resources are wasted in the process of grant-seeking. We provide a 
theoretical model to assess the net effect on welfare. A game-theoretic context is developed to 
derive the optimal grant-distribution scheme. Depending on the characteristics of the 
collective good and of the regional government, the optimal ratio of conditional to block 
grants and the optimal number of recipients vary. The impact of different factors on the 
optimal grant-distribution scheme is derived.  
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A substantial share of funds that are used in the provision of collective goods on the regional 
and local level stem from conditional grants these subordinate units receive from some supra-
ordinate government or institution (e.g., Lotz, 1990; Man and Bell, 1993; Greese, 1998; Bähr, 
2008; Strick, 2008; Denhardt and Denhardt, 2009: chapter 7, Zimmermann, 2009: chapter 5). 
Two justifications for conditional grants are discussed. The theoretical literature focuses on 
regional spillovers and vertical fiscal externalities. Here, conditional grants are given to 
certain regions in order to increase welfare in those adjacent governmental units that benefit 
or suffer from externalities produced by the recipient regions (e.g., Oates, 1999; Shah, 2006; 
Fenge and Wrede, 2007). Supra-ordinate governments and institutions frequently justify the 
use of conditional grants by arguing that they will increase welfare within the recipient region 
itself. This implies that the supra-ordinate government identifies inefficiencies in the regional 
or local production of collective goods. For example, the EU cohesion programs assume that 
at least some of the economically weak regions in the EU suffer from poor institutional 
quality (e.g., Bähr, 2008). The same is generally recognized to hold for the potential recipients 
of international development aid (e.g. Hefeker, 2006). In the US, conditional grants are 
arguably introduced to ensure that certain technological and organizational standards are met 
in the educational sector (e.g., Fisher and Papke, 2000; Cascio et al., 2008). The same holds 
for the funding of regional and local youth welfare policy in Germany (e.g., Greese, 1998). A 
number of papers recognize the justification (e.g., Schultze, 1974; Chernick, 1979; Bähr, 
2008; Byrnes and Dollery, 2002, Fenge and Wrede, 2007). The empirical literature has come 
up with evidence for inefficiencies in local and regional collective good productions in 
different countries and for different collective goods (e.g., Grossman et al., 1999; Kalb, 2008; 
Geys et al., 2009).  3 
 
By forcing the subordinate units into competing for conditional grants, the supra-ordinate 
government sets incentives for a more efficient production of collective goods. The 
subordinate units have to apply for conditional grants with each application containing a 
detailed description of the way that these funds are used and how they complement the overall 
production of the collective good. Given the large number of applications, the sum of funds 
applied for regularly exceeds the means that the supra-ordinate government reserved for 
conditional grants. Thus, some applications have to be turned down. It is precisely this 
competition that sets incentives for the subordinate units to propose a more efficient use of 
funds in order to attract grants. On the other hand, the competition for conditional grants 
evokes wasteful grant-seeking among potential recipients (e.g., Tullock, 1980). The amount 
of social waste depends on the rules according to which grants are distributed (e.g., Berry, 
1993; Nitzan, 1994), but the same rules influence the potential gains in efficiency induced by 
these grants.  
In this paper, we assume that there are inefficiencies in the production of local public services 
and thus the use of conditional grants may be justified. Our focus rests on the trade-off 
between efficiency-enhancing effects of conditional grants and the welfare losses due to 
grant-seeking. We provide a theoretical model to address the following question: How can the 
grant-distribution-scheme be designed to achieve a maximum gain in net welfare? The paper 
is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly reviews the relevant literature and sketches the 
institutional background to which our analysis applies. Section 3 presents a formal model of 
the grant-distribution-game and describes the characteristics of the optimal grant-distribution 
scheme. The central results are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Related literature 
A number of theoretical papers have identified asymmetric information as a source of 
inefficiency in collective good production on the subordinate level (e.g., Boadway et al., 4 
 
1999; Dixit, 2002). Here the supra-oprdinate government is the principal who delegates a 
certain task to the subordinate government – the agent. Due to the asymmetric information, 
neither the output nor technological or organisational standards are contractible. Thus, an 
optimal grant-distribution scheme must manipulate the agent’s goals in a way that increases 
their congruency with the principal’s goals. The recent literature shows that personalized 
incentive schemes may be harmful because they crowd out the intrinsic motivation especially 
in public sector employees (e.g., Frey, 1998; Francois, 2000; Besley and Ghatak, 2005). 
We focus on the role of grant-seeking in situation where contractibility is given. Thus, the 
subordinate units can credibly commit to a certain output level or to certain technological, 
organisational or institutional standards and the supra-ordinate granting institution can ex post 
verify that the commitments are met. On the other hand, we assume that forcing the 
subordinate units to meet certain standards or output levels is not a valid option. This 
assumption applies to a large array of situations where the subordinate units are formally 
independent like the regions in the EU, the recipient regions or countries of international 
development aid, the German “Länder” in the German federation. 
Inefficiencies in collective good production may result from an number of factors. First, 
regional pressure groups (e.g., Austen-Smith, 1997) may press authorities for weak 
institutional standards or favourable yet inefficient solutions in collective good production. 
For instance, the teachers’ union may press for slowing down the introduction of new media 
in education. Similarly, religious groups could demand that certain topics may or may not be 
part of the schools’ syllabus. Regional trade associations may press for a lax application of 
environmental, labor or anticorruption standards. Second, local voters regularly lack the bird’s 
eye view and the related knowledge about the performance of alternative technologies and 
organizational solutions in collective good production because they only observe a small and 
largely homogeneous subset of possible solutions. In this case, biased beliefs prevent the 5 
 
adoption of more efficient technologies and organizational forms (e.g., Oates, 1999; 
Belleflamme and Hindriks, 2005). Third, the local and regional authorities generally find it 
more difficult to find qualified personnel. Fourth, the subordinate government may entertain 
ideological or procedural preferences (e.g., Romer, 2003; Bischoff, 2008) that lead to 
inefficiencies. This may apply in a similar way to the local bureaucrats that provide the 
collective good. Following Besley and Ghatak (2005), procedural preferences may be 
especially strong when the collective good coheres around a mission, e.g. educating children, 
helping the ill or elderly. Here, employees are recognized to be highly motivated (e.g., 
Francois, 2000) but entertain strong convictions as to what technologies/methods, 
organisational solutions and institutional settings are appropriate to pursue the mission (e.g. 
Besley and Ghatak, 2005). Regional and local authorities do not apply a sufficiently 
heterogeneous set of technical and organisational solutions to develop a bird’s eye view. 
Consequently, the convictions of regional and local employees may be persistently wrong. In 
the case of teachers, they have firm beliefs concerning the best way to teach their students but 
these beliefs may be contradicted by the empirical evidence e.g. from the PISA study that 
relied on a large sample of heterogeneous solutions. 
A number of authors argue that conditional grant schemes are not welfare-enhancing because 
the granting governments distribute the grants not to maximize welfare but to pursue their 
own political goals. They provide evidence that supra-ordinate governments apply vertical 
grants to maximize political support (e.g., Grossman, 1994, 1996; Worthington and Dollery 
1998). Especially the discretionary freedom in conditional grants is used to this end. A 
support-maximizing scheme of distributing conditional grants induces excessive grant-
seeking and is therefore harmful to welfare. In the theoretical model provided in the upcoming 
section, we assume that the supra-ordinate government is benevolent and aims at maximizing 
overall welfare. Later in the paper, we discuss the implication of dropping this assumption 
and assuming opportunistic supra-ordinate governments instead.  6 
 
3. The model 
3.1 Agents, production function and game structure 
Consider a federation consisting of N regions. The regions are in charge of providing a certain 
collective good X. The central government has a fixed amount of funds F to support the 
production of X. We assume that the regional production of X is financed solely by earmarked 
vertical transfers from the central government. The parameter f denotes the share of funds 
transferred in form of conditional grants distributed upon regional application. For reasons of 
simplicity, we assume that they are distributed equally among 0 K N    regions.  The 
remaining fraction(1-f) of F is distributed as block grant of equal size to all N regions. Block 
grants are earmarked for the production of X but distributed without prior application. Thus, 
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  Let us assume that the central government aims at maximization of a simple utilitarian 
welfare function. Function    i hX  with  0 i hX    and 
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i hX 0    represents the utility of 
the representative consumer in region i. We assume the representative consumers to be 











The regional output depends on the resources used and the solution parameter Ai. It describes 
the technological and organisational solution applied in the production of Xi. The latter 
describes the policy solution that the region i applies in the production of X with  0 ii XA   
and 
22 0 ii XA   . A higher value of Ai thus represents a solution closer to the efficient 7 
 
frontier. In the relevant interval for our analysis, let the output of the regional service Xi be 





     
q qo
ii i i i Xv A q   (2) 
Let the regional authorities in charge of regional production be risk-neutral and utility 
maximizing. The regional government utility    , ii i Uv     is a positive function of the 
disposable budget (vi - i) (e.g., Tullock, 1980; Wintrobe, 1997) where i is the amount of 
resources it devotes to the application for conditional funds. In addition, the regional 
government is assumed to have policy preferences. Let 
o
i A  denote bliss solution parameter 
that maximizes the regional government’s utility when conditional grants are absent (i.e. 
f = 0). The application of a more efficient solution 
o
ii A A   causes losses in political support 
among pressure groups and ill-informed voters and/or losses in ideological or procedural 
utility among the regional government including the regional bureaucracy. However, to attract 
conditional grants, regional governments may be willing to apply more efficient technological 
or organisational solutions. Let 
o
ii i A A   denote the change in the solution parameter that 
region i chooses to attract conditional grants. For reasons of simplicity, we assume that 
regions are identical with respect to size, utility function, 
o
i A , and production function Xi(·).  
If f = 0, regions do not spent any resources on grant-seeking (i = 0). They will use vi = F/N 
on the production of X and apply  0  i  . For all values  0 f  , the probability that a certain 
region i receives conditional grants is denoted by pi. It depends on i, on  i   and on the 
corresponding j and  j   of all other regions j ≠ i. The more effort the region i exerts in the 
process of applying for grants, the higher the probability of receiving them – other things 
equal. In addition, the probability is higher the more adequate Ai. Following Berry (1993), we 
assume that the process of grant-allocation can be modelled as if it was a lottery in which 8 
 
0 KN regions receive a grant of size fF/K. The probability pN that region i = N receives 
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 with  
1 ,
rr
ii i i i    
  ,    0,1 r . 
The numerator of equation (3) consists of the π-value sums of all combinations of winning 
regions where region N is included.
1 The denominator represents all possible combinations of 
winning regions. The central government does not give conditional grants to regions that stick 
to 
o
i A , or spend no resources on grant-seeking ( 0 i   ); that is hand in no application. The 
more region i is willing to change its policy solution, i.e. the larger i, the higher pi, other 
things equal. In addition, pi increases in i. The parameter r reflects the relative impact of 
iandi  on pi. 
[insert table 1 about here] 
The interaction of regional and central governments can be modelled as a sequential game 
consisting of four stages (see table 1): In stage 1, the central government sets f and K and 
distributes the lump sum grants among the N regions. In stage 2, the regional governments 
decide about the solution change i and the amount of resources they want to spend on grant-
seeking. Both  i   and the grant-seeking effort i depend on f and K. Given this decision, they 
use the received lump sum grants net of grant seeking expenditures and the solution parameter 
                                                 
1 Winning the competition is understood as receiving the additional grant. 9 
 
o
ii i A A   to start producing  i X . At this stage, the central government is able to observe 
the level of  i   employed by the regions. We assume that the regional governments will not be 
able to change  i   ex post in case they do not receive conditional grants. In stage 3, 
conditional grants are distributed among K recipient regions chosen by the central 
government. Finally in stage 4, the recipient regions use these additional funds to expand the 
production of  i X . The central government has to solve this game by backward induction and 
choose the combination of f and K that maximizes overall welfare (see expression (2)) . For 
this purpose, it is necessary to develop the region’s reaction functions to f and K, 
 , ii f K    respectively   , ii f K   .  
3.2 Regional grant-seeking and the optimal grant-distribution scheme 
Given that all regions are identical, we assume that i = j  i,j holds in the Nash-equilibrium 
(see Berry, 1993): Thus, we will hereafter drop the subindex i to denote the single region to 
save notation. If  0 f  , no grant competition will take place, i.e. a utility maximizing region 
will set  0    and  0   . For those cases where  0 f  , the regional government maximizes 
its expected utility by solving the following optimization problem: 
 
   0
,
max E U v , : v ; ,

  
      (4) 
We apply a Kuhn-Tucker approach to solve the maximization problem of the representative 
government. The corresponding Lagrange-function reads:  
         1 Z pU v , p U v , v    
         (5) 
Using    UU v ,  
   and    UU v ,  
 
 
the first-order conditions are given by: 
 
 00 0
ZU U p U Z
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 (7) 
 





    

 (8) 
The conditions for an inner solution of the optimization problem are: 
  00 v, ,
      (9) 
An inner solution requires the regional government to change its solution parameter and spend 
a positive share yet less than 100% of the block-grant received in stage 2 on grant-seeking. 
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    
        
   (11) 
Solving (10) and (11) yields the Nash equilibrium values 
 and 
. It is reasonable to 
assume a quasi linear regional utility function with disposable funds serving as numéraire 
good and    u  being the disutility of the average policy concession, with  0 u  and 
22 0 u   . 
     Uv , v u       (12) 
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In order to solve equations (13) and (14) for 
*   and 
*   we specify 
 with   0 1
z ub ,b , z      . The parameter  0 b   represents the relative weight of the 
disutility from   compared to   From the probability definition in (3) the following Nash-
equilibrium derivatives can be obtained: 
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Together with (13) and (14) this leads to 
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        
 (18) 
The grant seeking effort is lower than the lump sum grant if the following inequality holds:










In those cases where restriction (19) applies, the grant-seeking effort is given by the limit 
  1
* vf F N 
   . It is straightforward to see that the fcritical  increases in K and decreases 
in  r and N. An increase in r leads to a relative higher impact of grant-seeking on the 
probability of winning the competition. Thus we would expect that overall grant-seeking 
activities will increase. 
[insert figure 1 about here] 
                                                 
2 Where this restriction applies, the central government faces incentives to set f very large to change the policy 
vector and at the same time limits the grants-seeking effort due to the restriction (8). Taking this argument to the 
limit, it will set a value of f just below 1. This strategy is unlikely to work in the real world because of the 
possibility to cross-subsidize grant-seeking. Incorporating this possibility in the current model would require a 
number of additional ad hoc assumptions. As we will show below, restriction (19) holds for virtually all 
realisations of the current model. The restriction applies only to cases with extreme parameter settings. For these 
cases, we will hereafter assume that the central government will set f and K to the welfare-maximizing internal 
solution.  12 
 
Figure 1 shows the critical values of f as a function of KN  for N = 24 and N = 100. In the 
most restrictive case where K = 1, the corner-solution applies for values of f > 0.53 with 
N = 100 and  r0 . 9  . This result changes only marginally when N is reduced to 24. As K 
increases, the corner-solution only applies to cases where almost all central funds are 
distributed via conditional grants. As long as restriction (19) holds, * increases in f  (
* */ 0    ff ) and decreases in K  */ 0 K   . It is easy to see that * > 0 as soon as 
f > 0 and – which is implied by the first condition – 0 < K < N. At the same time, * 
increases in f (
* */ (1 ) 0 fz f     ) and decreases in K ( */ 0 K   ).
3 
The Nash-equilibrium derived here reveals an essential trade-off: Increasing the share of 
conditional grants improves overall welfare by causing all regions to apply a more appropriate 
solution parameter. At the same time, a concomitant increase in grant-seeking effort reduces 
welfare in all regions. A similar trade-off exists when the central government changes K 
because both * and * decrease in K. The net effect of changes in f and K on welfare thus 
depends on the production function for X.  
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   (20) 
We specify the utility of the representative regional consumer by     ln ii hX X   such that:
4
           1
** * o WF q K ln v N K ln v N q ln A  
         (21) 
                                                 
3Treating K as a real number   
** 0 KN K N K          and   
** 0 KN z K N K         . 
4 This specification is necessary in order to perform simulations. The simulations were rerun using the alternative 
specifications (Xi)
1/2 or simply Xi instead of ln(Xi) as expression for the welfare of the regional consumer in 
region i. The results do not differ qualitatively across specifications. 13 
 
We cannot derive general expressions for the welfare maximizing combination of f and K 
(hereafter (f*,K*)) and use these expressions to show analytically how (f*,K*) depends on the 
exogenous parameters b, 
o
i A , q, F, r, z and N. Instead, simulations are used to derive the 
combination of K and f maximizes WF. In these simulations, we derive the welfare 
maximizing values (f*,K*) for a specific parameter constellation and show how it reacts to 
changes in parameters. Row 1 in table 2 shows the parameter values in the standard scenario.  
[insert table 2 about here] 
3.3 Simulation results 
In the standard scenario, simulations yield an optimal strategy of the central government 
(f*, K*) = (0.22, 1). Consequently, welfare rises to WF* = 26.45 compared to the WF0 = 8.32 
that would emerge without conditional transfers (i. e. for f = 0). The regional grant-seeking 
effort amounts to * = 1.027 and the change in the policy vector is given by * = 1.024. The 
region that received conditional grants uses resources equal to v
+ – *  =  7.80 + 52.8 – 
1.054 = 59.546, the remaining N-1 regions use v
– – * = 6.746. The welfare for the 
representative regional consumer is given by 2.15 in the recipient region and 1.06 in the N-1 
others (see table 3, appendix). 
Starting from this standard scenario, we analyse the impact of variations in the exogenous 
parameters. First, we will turn to the relative weights of   in the regional utility function. The 
larger the corresponding parameter b, the larger the disutility the regional government 
witnesses when deviating from 
o
i A . The larger b is, the smaller f*, and the larger the ratio of 
WF*/WF0 (see figure 2 and table 3, appendix). f* remains below the corner solution threshold 
(19) here and for all parameter variations to follow. The optimal K* = 1 for all values of b and 14 
 
z.
 5 The corresponding regional parameters * and * decrease with f* as b increases. The 
same pattern shows as z increases. 
[insert figure 2 about here] 
The higher 
o
i A , the less severe the regional inefficiencies, the larger WF0 and the higher are 
opportunity costs of grant-seeking. Consequently, f* decreases in 
o
i A , leading to a reduction 
in * and *. Again, K* = 1 for all values of 
o
i A . The opportunity costs of grant-seeking 
increase in q while the benefits from changes in  decrease. Thus, f* decreases in q. Again, 
K* = 1 for all values of q. Only for very large values of q, K* increases marginally. As a 
result, * and * are reduced.  In simulations where N and F increase simultaneously such 
that  /1 0 FN  , f* decreases in N while K*= 1 in all scenarios. Consequently, * and * 
decrease. When the amount of funds available  / F N  per region is increased (N  is kept 
constant), the welfare-improving responsiveness of * is initially larger than the welfare-
losses to increased grant-seeking. As a consequence, f* increases in  / F N . Again, K* = 1 for 
all values of  / F N . As a result, * and * increase. The opposite pattern emerges when N 
increases while F is kept constant, again with K* = 1 for all values of N. An increasing value 
of r raises productivity of regional grant-seeking relative to changes in  and leads to an 
increase in 
*   peaking at r = 0.86. A further increase in r leads to a decrease in 
*   The effect 
of grant-seeking on the winning probability is then outweighed by the diametrical effect of a 
smaller share of conditional grants as 
* f  decreases in r. 
                                                 
5 All relations between dependent variables and  exogenous parameters found in the partial parameter variations 
can be replicated for different values of the constant parameters and in simulations with simultaneous variations 
in parameters. To avoid excessively long tables in the paper, we do not report all results here. They are available 
upon request.  15 
 
3.4. Extension 
So far we assumed a four stage game where the regional governments start producing X using 
the lump sum grant without knowledge whether they will receive the conditional grant or not 
but have to pre-commit to a certain solution value 
o A A  . This implies that step-by-step 
production of X is actually possible. However there may be cases where the local collective 
good can only be produced in one large step when the full budget is known. This applies to 
goods where an encompassing concept is necessary before production can take place, for 
example buildings or the creation of new university degree programmes. In these cases, the 
central government cannot observe the solution parameter Ai before the conditional grant are 
distributed. Thus, regions that do not receive the conditional grant rationally stick to 
o
i A  (i.e. 
0 i    if  i vv
  ). We assume that in order not to destroy the chance to receive conditional 
grants in the future, regions receiving conditional grants apply their chosen  i   offered in their 
application. In this case the game structure only consists of 3 stages, which are given in table 
4.  
[insert table 4 about here] 
The regional governments will maximize their expected utility according to the problem given 
in equation (4), but now non-recipient regions face a different utility:   ,0 UU v
  . At 
the same time, the grant seeking expenditure are lost irreversibly. The Lagrange function (5) 
then changes to 
         10 Z pU v , p U v , v    
         (22) 
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Note that for equal exogenous parameters and equal f and K the optimum value 
* '   is lower 
than 
*   and 
* '   exceeds 
*  : 
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The inner solution threshold for f then becomes: 






rNK z N K
f' f'
rNKN K rz N K

  
          
 (26) 
Using simulations it can be shown that the results for  'critical f  are similar to the results in 
figure 1.
6 The simulations for the welfare optimization problem of the central government are 
run using the standard parameter constellation as a starting point (see table 2, row 2). 
Simulations yield an optimal strategy of the central government (f*, K*) = (0.49, 16)  and 
WF* = 18.75 compared to the WF0 =  8.32. The regional grant-seeking effort amounts to 
* = 0.051 and the change in the policy vector is given by * = 0.276. The 16 recipient 
regions have resources equal to v
+ – *  =  4.80 + 6.80 – 0.051  =  11.09, the remaining 8 
regions use v
– – * = 4.29. The welfare for the representative regional consumer is given by 
0.89 in the recipient regions and 0.005 in the others. Compared to the results in reported for 
the basic model specification, we observe a higher share of conditional grants being 
distributed among a large number of recipients. As a result WF*, * *  and the difference 
                                                 




- is much smaller. Due to the difference in solutions applied, however, the 
inequality in welfare of the representative regional consumer is larger.  
 With respect to K*, we observe an essential difference between the optimal grant-distribution 
schemes across model specifications. While it is optimal to give conditional grants only to one 
region, grants are optimally spread between a large number of recipients in the modified 
model. Here, K* = 1 is never optimal. It can be observed that the optimal ratio 
* KN  varies 
between 54.2% and 79.2% (i.e. K
* = 13 to 19 when N = 24). In the modified scenario, K* 
increases with respect to q, F, N and z and decreases with respect to b, A
0, and r. The patterns 
described in section 3.3 hold for the modified model presented here (see table 5 and figure 3, 
appendix).
7 For a given parameter setting, the welfare gains from the optimal grant-
distribution scheme in the basic specification exceeds the gains achievable for the modified 
model. 
4. Discussion  
The sections above show that conditional grants may be a suitable means of reducing 
inefficiencies in regional and local collective good production even when they evoke wasteful 
grant-seeking. The optimal grant-distribution scheme is determined by the preferences of the 
regional authorities (described by
o
i A , b, z), the number of regions N, the regional production 
function (described by q), the total funds F, and the relative importance of resources spent on 
the application for grants as opposed to the efficiency-increasing changes in technology and 
organisational solutions offered therein (described by r). A larger share of conditional grants 
is optimal the larger the inefficiencies, the more budget-seeking the regional authorities are, 
the smaller the number of regions, the more funds are available in total and the more strongly 
                                                 
7 Note that K is an integer which leads to discontinuities in the trends of f*, * and * on the one and the 
exogenous parameters on the other side. Within each interval of the varied parameter, where K* is constant, f*, 
* and * follow a similar pattern as in the basic scenario. For some parameter variations such as A
0 the 
dependent variables reveal a slightly different behaviour for extreme parameter settings. 18 
 
the distribution of grants depends on the technological and organisational changes. In 
addition, we show that the optimal grant-distribution scheme depends on whether the 
collective good can be produced in a stepwise procedure and extended when more funds are 
available (case 1, section 3.1-3.3) or whether the full amount needs to be produced in one step 
(case 2, section 3.4). In case 1, it is optimal to concentrate conditional grants to one region 
while a wide dispersion of conditional grants is optimal in case 2. Compared to case 2, the 
optimal share of conditional grants in case 1 is lower but nevertheless induces higher changes 
in technology and organisational structure and higher net welfare gains.  
The rationale behind these distinctly different solutions is the following: In case 1, all regions 
– regardless of their later success in the grant-distribution process – have to pre-commit to 
certain improvements in the technological or organisational solution. Thus, high incentives for 
efficiency improvements need to be combined with a limited inequality in funding ex post. 
This is best achieved by combining a substantial block grant with one large extra grant to a 
single region. In case 2, efficiency gains can only be expected for regions receiving 
conditional grants. Thus, these must be spread widely among regions. To keep up incentives 
in this case, a substantial share of funds is conditional. Keeping the block grant to non-
recipient regions low has much lower opportunity costs in case 2 because these regions apply 
inefficient technological and organisational solutions. These results also indicate that a 
benevolent central government must distribute funds as described in the 4-stage game 
whenever this is possible.  
Our model focuses on the trade-off between efficiency-gains induced by conditional grants 
and the welfare-losses due to wasteful grant-seeking. Given this focus, it ignores the fact that 
many conditional grants are matching grants and require co-financing by regular regional 
revenues (e.g., Fenge and Wrede, 2007). By redirecting funds to subsidized goods, they have 
additional welfare implications that are not captured in our model. If inefficiencies only occur 19 
 
in the production of X, and the other goods do not produce fiscal externalities or spillovers, 
our model overstates the gains from conditional grants and suggests inefficiently high values 
of f respectively low values for K. Apart from that, there is no reason to assume that the 
general conclusions of the model and the way the optimal grant-distribution scheme reacts to 
variations in central parameters do not hold.
8  
The applicability of conditional grants depends on a number of preconditions (e.g., Chernick, 
1979; Ferris and Winkler, 1991). First, the central government must be able to verify that 
grantees follow certain organisational and technological standards of production. Second, 
there must be implicit or explicit sanctions for those grantees that do not follow the standards 
proposed in the application or provide a lower quality of goods and services. In many cases, 
the threat to be banned from future application rounds is a very effective instrument to ensure 
compliance. These preconditions are not met if the distribution of information between 
regional and central government is highly asymmetric. In this case, opportunistic regional 
governments can apply 
o
i A  regardless of the solutions initially stated in the application 
without having to fear sanctions (e.g., Boadway et al., 1999; Gilbert and Rocaboy, 2004). 
Consequently, conditional grants do not have any impact on the solutions applied in collective 
good production. Given that they nevertheless evoke wasteful grant-seeking, their welfare 
effects are negative. 
The third condition for the applicability of conditional funds refers to the central 
government’s motivation. So far, we assumed that the central government maximizes welfare 
and takes grant-seeking as necessary costs of introducing efficiency gains. If, however, the 
central government is not benevolent, it may even cause net losses in welfare when being 
allowed to introduce conditional grants. First, the central government may concentrate 
conditional grants to so-called swing regions in order to maximize political support for their 
                                                 
8   In cases where the other regionally provided goods are subject to inefficiencies, fiscal externalities or 
spillovers, it is not possible to make generalizable statements concerning the welfare-implications. 20 
 
own re-election campaign (i.e. Dixit, A. and Londregan, J., 1996; Dahlberg, M. and 
Johansson, E., 2002). Second, it may allocate grants primarily to those regions where the 
incumbent belongs to the same party. In these cases, gains in regional efficiency are no longer 
the primary concern. If the prioritized recipients know this, they will offer smaller changes in 
technological and organisational solutions. In the context of our model, this means region-
specific functions for i and a large value for r. Welfare gains are expected to be smaller. 
Third, the central government may be interested in extracting rents (e.g. McChesney, 1997; 
Page, 2005). In this case, it will operate with a value of r ≈ 1 and set f > f* and K < K*. If 
rent-extraction is the only aim, f finds its limit only in expression (15) respectively (26). In the 
scenario of section 3.2 and 3.3, the inner solution threshold for f is given by fcritical = 0.537. 
Choosing f = 0.5 and r = 0.9 the solution change becomes  0.69    (
*** ( , ) 0.38 fK   ) and 
the grant-seeking expenditures extend to  4.31    (
*** (, )1 . 2 9 fK   ).
9 This causes massive 
net welfare losses due to grant seeking compared to a solution without conditional grants 
0 ( 1.39) WF WF   . For the modified scenario in section 3.4 the results are even more 
severe as the central government will not only employ f = 0.5 (fcritical = 0.55) but also K = 1. 
Here, the winner’s solution change  3.31    exceeds the solution change when net welfare is 
maximized (
*** (, )0 . 1 2 fK   ), but net welfare with conditional grants is lower than without 
conditional grants ( 0 3.03 WF WF   ) due to excessive grant-seeking activities  4.12    
*** ( ( , ) 0.08) fK    among all N regions.  
Given that welfare-improving effect of limiting the social costs of grant-seeking, the 
following question arises: Is it possible to limit grant-seeking expenditures through 
institutional rules? Good institutional rules lead to a small value for parameter r in the model 
presented here. With respect to the mere costs of preparing applications, the central 
government may well limit the effort, e.g. by limiting the length of the application to a few 
                                                 
9 The other parameters are left at the standard scenario values (see table 2). 21 
 
pages and limiting the number of applications per region. However, if the projects are 
complex, limiting application length makes it more difficult to judge the quality of the 
proposed project. Moreover, the application is not the only effort-consuming activity in the 
process of grant-seeking. In addition, regions may invest in public relations to improve their 
image or exert public pressure on the central government to press them for grants (e.g., 
Tullock, 1993). These activities are beyond the control of the central government and they are 
very difficult to restrict unless the latter can credibly commit to ignore them. A credible 
commitment to a small value of r is possible if the selection procedure is double-blind or 
outsourced to a neutral institution. The Australian Commonwealth Grant Commission can be 
interpreted as an attempt to keep r low (e.g., Worthington and Dollery, 1998). Another 
effective way to limit wasteful grant-seeking is to install an administration fee for every 
application. While it leaves the total grant-seeking expenditures * unaltered, it can restrict 
the degree to which they represent social waste.  
5. Conclusion 
This paper addresses the welfare-effects of conditional project grants when there are 
inefficiencies in regional collective good production. Conditional grants can improve 
efficiency but they also evoke wasteful grant-seeking. We use a game-theoretic framework to 
derive the welfare-maximizing grant-distribution scheme for the central government. This 
optimal scheme involves some share of funds to be distributed as conditional grants regardless 
of the regional characteristics. Conditional grants are effective and thus should be used 
intensively if the regional governments are budget-maximizers with loose preferences for 
specific technological or organisational solutions in collective good production. A number of 
other factors are found to co-determine the efficient grant-distribution scheme. Most 
importantly, the central government should distribute block grants and conditional grants in 
two consecutive steps whenever this is possible. Thereby, they can force all regional 22 
 
authorities to pre-commit to more efficient technological and organisational solutions  n in 
collective good production before conditional grants are distributed. In order to restrict the 
costs of grant-seeking, it can set an application fee or make a binding commitment to make 
grant-seeking expenditures that go beyond the necessary costs of preparing the application 
ineffective.  
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Table 1: 4-stage game structure 
Stage Activity 
1 
The central government sets  f  and K  and gives 
the lump sum grants to the regional governments. 
2 
The regional governments choose  (grant seeking) 
and   (solution change) given  f  and K and start 
the production of X using  ii v
   and  i  . 
3 
The central government observes the technological 
standard used by the regions in step 2 and then 
distributes the conditional grants  fFK  among the 
K  winning regions of the competition. 
4 
The recipient regions produce more X using funds 






Table 2: Standard parameter values (reference scenario), the 3-stage game refers to section 3.4. 
  Standard parameter values  Simulation results 
  N F  q  b  A








24 240 0,500 0,500 0,200 2,000 0,500 0,490 16 0,276 0,051 14,24 8,32 0,67
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b  0,100 0,230  1  2,347 1,102 34,98 8,32 2,53 1,41 0,04
0,250 0,220  1  1,452 1,054 30,02 8,32 2,29 1,21 0,04
0,500 0,220  1  1,027 1,054 26,45 8,32 2,15 1,06 0,04
0,750 0,210  1  0,819 1,006 24,45 8,32 2,03 0,97 0,04
0,900 0,210  1  0,748 1,006 23,58 8,32 2,00 0,94 0,04
A
0  0,300 0,210  1  1,003 1,006 27,40 13,18 2,16 1,10 0,04
0,750 0,160  1  0,876 0,767 31,12 24,18 2,16 1,26 0,04
1,500 0,110  1  0,726 0,527 35,81 32,50 2,17 1,46 0,04
2,250 0,090  1  0,657 0,431 39,35 37,36 2,24 1,61 0,04
2,700 0,070  1  0,579 0,335 41,10 39,55 2,22 1,69 0,04
q  0,100 0,550  1  1,623 2,635 14,90 -29,24 1,03 0,60 0,04
0,250 0,400  1  1,384 1,917 17,53 -15,15 1,50 0,70 0,04
0,500 0,220  1  1,027 1,054 26,45 8,32 2,15 1,06 0,04
0,750 0,100  1  0,692 0,479 38,89 31,79 2,58 1,58 0,04
0,900 0,040  1  0,438 0,192 47,97 45,87 2,61 1,97 0,04
N,  40 0,210  1  1,012 1,024 43,69 13,86 2,35 1,06 0,03
F = 10N  64 0,200  1  0,992 0,984 69,44 22,18 2,54 1,06 0,02
104 0,200  1 0,995 0,990 112,24 36,04 2,77 1,06 0,01
144 0,200  1 0,997 0,993 154,97 49,91 2,93 1,06 0,01
168 0,200  1 0,997 0,994 180,58 58,22 3,01 1,06 0,01
F,  240 0,220  1 1,027 1,054 26,45 8,32 2,15 1,06 0,04
N = 24  600 0,230  1 1,660 2,755 42,20 19,31 2,83 1,71 0,04
1200 0,230  1  2,347 5,510 54,29 27,63 3,33 2,22 0,04
1800 0,230  1  2,875 8,266 61,42 32,50 3,63 2,51 0,04
2160 0,230  1  3,149 9,919 64,63 34,68 3,76 2,65 0,04
N,   40 0,200  1  0,765 0,585 29,32 3,65 1,96 0,70 0,03
F = 240  64 0,190  1  0,592 0,351 25,62 -9,21 1,82 0,38 0,02
104 0,180  1 0,454 0,206 6,70 -40,21 1,69 0,05 0,01
144 0,170  1 0,375 0,141 -22,43 -79,10 1,59 -0,17 0,01
168 0,160  1 0,337 0,114 -43,46 -105,23 1,53 -0,27 0,01
r  0,100 0,310  1  1,635 0,297 31,19 8,32 2,50 1,25 0,04
0,250 0,270  1  1,393 0,647 29,52 8,32 2,37 1,18 0,04
0,500 0,220  1  1,027 1,054 26,45 8,32 2,15 1,06 0,04
0,750 0,180  1  0,657 1,294 22,32 8,32 1,88 0,89 0,04
0,900 0,150  1  0,379 1,294 18,04 8,32 1,61 0,71 0,04
z  1,175 0,310  1  2,202 1,485 32,13 8,32 2,63 1,28 0,04
1,475 0,270  1  1,464 1,294 28,86 8,32 2,38 1,15 0,04
1,975 0,220  1  1,034 1,054 26,52 8,32 2,15 1,06 0,04
2,475 0,190  1  0,883 0,910 25,63 8,32 2,02 1,03 0,04
2,775 0,170  1  0,825 0,815 25,39 8,32 1,95 1,02 0,04
                                                 
10 As noted above detailed simulation results are available upon request. Parameters which are not varied are left 
at their standard values (see table 2). 28 
 
Table 4: 3-stage game structure  
Stage Activity 
1  The central government sets  f  and K . 
2 
The regional governments choose  (grant seeking) 
and   (solution change) given  f  and K . 
3  X is produced. 
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b  0,100 0,610  18  0,530 0,042 18,75 8,32 1,085 -0,130 0,75
0,250 0,540  17  0,361 0,046 16,00 8,32 0.961 -0,047 0,71
0,500 0,490  16  0,276 0,051 14,24 8,32 0,888 0,005 0,67
0,750 0,470  16  0,221 0,049 13,35 8,32 0,822 0,025 0,67
0,900 0,460  16  0,199 0,048 12,97 8,32 0,794 0,034 0,67
A
0  0,300 0,450  16  0,264 0,047 17,41 13,18 0,965 0,246 0,67
0,750 0,290  14  0,271 0,043 25,89 24,18 1,254 0,833 0,58
1,500 0,200  13  0,254 0,035 33,26 32,50 1,509 1,240 0,54
2,250 0,160  13  0,227 0,028 37,82 37,36 1,667 1,468 0,54
2,700 0,140  13  0,213 0,024 39,91 39,55 1,741 1,571 0,54
q  0,100 0,840  15  0,409 0,104 -15,32 -29,24 -0,177 -1,408 0,63
0,250 0,700  16  0,330 0,073 -4,74 -15,15 0,173 -0,939 0,67
0,500 0,490  16  0,276 0,051 14,24 8,32 0,888 0,005 0,67
0,750 0,320  17  0,196 0,027 34,20 31,79 1,587 1,032 0,71
0,900 0,180  17  0,147 0,015 46,62 45,87 2,030 1,731 0,71
N,  40 0,450 26  0,216 0,030 21,93 13,86 -0,567 -0,971 0,65
F = 10N  64 0,430 41  0,171 0,019 32,76 22,18 -0,591 -0,950 0,64
104 0,390  64  0,138 0,012 49,85 36,04 -0,626 -0,930 0,62
144 0,360  86  0,119 0,008 66,28 49,91 -0,644 -0,917 0,60
168 0,350 100  0,109 0,007 75,94 58,22 -0,650 0,910 0,60
F,   240 0,490  16  0,276 0,051 14,24 8,32 -0,523 -0,994 0,67
N = 24  600 0,550  17  0,407 0,117 27,62 19,31 0,021 -0,598 0,71
1200 0,610  18  0,530 0,211 38,07 27,63 0,430 -0,303 0,75
1800 0,620  18  0,655 0,322 44,29 32,50 0,694 -0,119 0,75
2160 0,620  18  0,718 0,386 47,12 34,68 0,815 -0,038 0,75
N,   40 0,410 25  0,171 0,018 10,11 3,65 -0,857 -1,199 0,63
F = 240  64 0,350 38  0,109 0,007 -2,55 -9,21 -1,148 -1,401 0,59
104 0,270  58  0,065 0,002 -33,69 -40,21 -1,434 -1,614 0,56
144 0,230  77  0,047 0,001 -72,84 -79,10 -1,621 -1,765 0,53
168 0,210  88  0,039 0,001 -99,12 -105,23 -1,706 -1,831 0,52
r  0,100 0,550  17  0,345 0,009 15,76 8,32 0,949 -0,054 0,71
0,250 0,540  17  0,312 0,023 15,27 8,32 0,916 -0,044 0,71
0,500 0,490  16  0,276 0,051 14,24 8,32 0,888 -0,005 0,67
0,750 0,450  16  0,187 0,070 12,74 8,32 0,776 0,041 0,67
0,900 0,370  15  0,122 0,083 11,19 8,32 0,681 0,109 0,63
z  1,175 0,400  10  0,521 0,114 13,21 8,32 1,207 0,082 0,42
1,475 0,440  13  0,327 0,077 13,37 8,32 0,986 0,050 0,54
1,975 0,490  16  0,273 0,051 14,20 8,32 0,885 0,005 0,67
2,475 0,530  18  0,271 0,037 15,18 8,32 0,855 -0,035 0,75
   2,775 0,560  19  0,275 0,031 15,75 8,32 0,847 -0,067 0,79
  
                                                 
11 As noted above detailed simulation results are available upon request. Parameters which are not varied are left 
at their standard values (see table 2). 30 
 
Figure 1: Threshold values for f (inner solution threshold) 
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